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Business relationships are a central feature of industrial networks. However, each firm in a 
relationship necessarily has a different perspective simply because of the complementary 
nature of the association, different firm history and different place of each partner within 
multiple perspectives of the network and the different boundaries. Further, each firm will 
operate with differing managerial purpose and timeline and in addition some variations in 
methods of managing.  
 
The result is that quantitative analysis of interaction within relationships requires separate 
examination of each party. More precisely the two firms of a relationship cannot be 
quantitatively examined by simply aggregating their separate perceptions concerning how 
they operate together. Rather firms may have asymmetric perspectives of their relationship, 
unless the firms work closely together and so have similar or symmetric views of their 
operations.  
 
Dyad studies of firms in business relationships are the only way to develop an understanding 
of the different ways firms operate relationships by managing each other (ie cooperate) and 
managing against each other (ie compete). However, there is a paucity of quantitative 
empirical dyadic studies.  
 
The literature observes that business relationships contain mixtures of cooperation and 
competition. This empirical paper presents a rare quantitative and qualitative dyadic study of 
the asymmetry and symmetry of perspectives of the strategic relationships of a single firm. 
The study applies regression analysis to find the active constructs explaining relationship 
performance by each firm. In the next part of the analysis the different forms of asymmetry 
and symmetry within 13 business relationships are examined, by examining the nature of the 
active constructs associated with each firm in the dyad. 
 
The study finishes by highlighting the issue of asymmetry and so provides theoretical 










Many authors have examined business relationships and networks (Achrol and Kotler 
1999; Ford et al. 2003; Håkansson 1982). It is observed that inter-organizational 
networks have experienced an unprecedented growth in the form of strategic 
alliances, acquisitions, partnerships and collaborations among firms (Möller and 
Svahn 2003). Moller and Svahn (2003 ), suggest the primary goal in pursuing 
business networks is to gain efficiency, growth opportunity and access to resources or 
a wider customer base. This is also in line with the view that business relationships 
and networks are often a potential source of competitive advantage (Wilkinson and 
Young 2002). Over the years, the growing number of forms of inter-organizational 
partnering depicts a large number of key players/hub firms, restricting themselves to a 
small number of competitive partners with complementary capabilities (Turnbull et al. 
1996). 
 
Håkansson (1982) notes, the importance of long-term business-to-business 
relationships, as opposed to the single episode or transaction-based relationships, 
illustrating the need for more academic and empirical research, on business 
relationships. However, the ever-growing trend of business collaborations and 
partnerships faces many issues when it comes to “managing” these dynamic networks 
and relationships (Möller and Svahn 2003). These issues arise from interactions 
within the relationship and across networks, where “managing” can only be applied in 
an imprecise way since more than one actor influences outcomes. In this paper we 
focus directly on managing firms in relationships composed of two firms (ie dyads); 
we ignore the network except as a secondary factor affecting firms and relationships. 
 
Managing firms within industrial markets needs an understanding beyond the 
traditional marketing literature that was developed for the consumer markets. Ford et 
al. (2003) indicates that, the traditional view of consumer marketing is not applicable 
to the understanding of industrial business relationships as: 
1. It concentrates on the purchase process of a single purchase 
2. It relies on the consumer-marketing literature, with the view that buyers are 
individually insignificant, passive and part of a relatively homogenous market. 
 
Halinen (1998) makes an important theoretical contribution to understanding business 
relationships in noting they represent two ‘codes’, not one. That is two firms with 
different purposes interact according to their own way of ‘managing’ within a 
business relationship. Each firm necessarily has different systems, processes and 
understandings regarding how to interact with another firm, based on past experience 
and strategic intention which both follow from a firm’s unique identity and position 
within networks. The idea of two codes was recognized early within business 
interaction literature (Håkansson 1982), although not fully understood. The 
implication is that one can only consider a relationship level construct where the 
codes (ie signs, language, policies, procedures, systems) are equivalent. Evidently in a 
heterogenous environment the natural state of codes in a relationship is difference, 
which we term asymmetry.  
 
Medlin (2003a) indicates that, since business relationships are formed as an outcome 
of interaction between two businesses, it is likely that firms in relationships will have 
varying perspectives and expectations. Business relationships are based on a 
 3 
complementary resource and activity association, but each firm has a history and 
different understanding of their networks, and so each firm will operate with different 
managerial purpose and mode of interaction (Medlin 2003a). The result is that firms 
in a business relationship will naturally have different perspectives so that the dyad is 
asymmetric; unless the firms work very closely together and so have similar and 
symmetric views of their operations.  
 
This means each firm in a relationship must be examined separately, or more 
precisely, relationship or dyad constructs cannot be examined by simply aggregating 
each firm’s separate perception concerning how they operate together (Medlin 
2003a). Even to apply a weighted method of aggregation without first checking for 
equivalence is not appropriate. 
 
Another issue in understanding business relationships arises from a firm’s need to 
balance their interactions with a range of firms. The portfolio of relationships in a 
firm’s business network is a part of a firm’s strategic resources (Turnbull et al. 1996). 
Each relationship has a place, yet each is inherently different, with some more 
strategically critical than others.  
 
Relationship portfolios and network connections add another dimension to 
understanding relationships (Ford et al. 2003; Håkansson and Snehota 1995). The 
connectedness of firms in networks makes determining the effect and performance of 
a single relationship difficult to disentangle. Who can say whether the performance of 
one relationship is intrinsic to those firms, or really dependent on another firm 
connected to that relationship? In networks of firms there are difficulties in estimating 
the direct costs and benefits from each relationship. However, firms can attribute a 
level of performance to their individual business relationships (cf Aulakh et al. 1996; 
Holm et al. 1996; Medlin 2003b; Medlin 2006) and this allows an exploration of how 
firm managerial codes may vary across a relationship. 
 
Dyadic studies of firms in business relationships remain the only way to fully develop 
our understanding of the interaction between firms (Medlin 2006). The aim of this 
paper is to quantitatively measure the inter-firm relationship performance and 
symmetry/asymmetry within the business dyads of a single organizations portfolio of 
relationships, and to qualitatively examine these distinctions across the firm’s 
relationship portfolio. The paper proceeds with a review of the business-to-business 
relationships literature. This is followed by the discussion of research methodology, 
leading to the analysis of the survey results. In conclusion, the survey findings and 





A trend to build long-term buyer-seller, manufacturer and supplier relationships has 
been commonplace for many major companies, such as: General Motors, Xerox, Dell, 
Black & Decker, to name just a few (Ganesan 1994). The focus of organizations has 
been the pursuit of efficiency and higher economic outcomes through long-term 
relationships (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Ganesan 1994). Long-term relationships 
provide organizations with access to customers or to required resources (Håkansson 
and Snehota 1995). However, long-term business relationships also lead to mutual 
 4 
dependence, or interdependence (Dwyer et al. 1987; Ford et al. 2003; Håkansson and 
Snehota 1995; Morgan and Hunt 1994). Mattson and Johanson (2006) indicate “that 
industrial markets were characterised by: 
1. Mutual dependence between seller and buyer 
2. Often long-term dynamic relationships between seller and buyer 
3. Interaction between active buyers and active sellers to solve the buyer's 
problems, including technical problems and product development 
4. Importance of organising for interaction.” 
 
These mutual and long-term aspects of relationships have lead researchers naturally to 
examine business networks. However, there is also a need to examine the 
relationships that form a network (Easton 1992). Each of the above characteristics of 
industrial markets represents an analogue concept from a firm’s perspective within a 
business relationship. Further, from a firm’s perspective there are both costs and 
benefits from relationships (Wilkinson and Young 2002). We now consider each of 
the characteristics of industrial markets from a firm’s perspective. 
 
Mutual dependence is the outcomes of a process (Svensson 2002) and refers to a 
reliance on the other to achieve a firm’s goal (Andaleeb 1995). With mutualness there 
is on the one-hand a requirement of cooperation and complementarity between the 
firms (Dyer and Singh 1998), but there is also a natural tension between the firms in a 
relationship as they seek profits (Medlin 2006). Each inter-organizational relationship 
exhibits a certain level of conflict, cooperation, collaborative and self interests 
simultaneously (Bengtsson and Kock 1999; Medlin 2006; Young and Wilkinson 
1997). This asymmetry suggests each firm in a relationship follows a separate, but 
also conjoined code. 
 
The long-term interaction between firms leads to specific adaptation by each firm 
(Hallén et al. 1991). This long-term adaptation leads to the formation of a network of 
firms operating according to a ‘logic’ (Håkansson and Snehota 1995). However, from 
a firm’s perspective, they face a portfolio of relationships in a network. This portfolio 
of relationships is a part of a firm’s strategic resources (Turnbull et al. 1996). Each 
firm in the portfolio requires different managerial activities and resource allocation, 
and this suggests different prioritisation of available time according to strategic 
importance (Zolkiewski and Turnbull 2002). Further, each relationship in the portfolio 
will have different firms connected to the other party and this brings an inherent 
diversity to the way each relationship is managed (Zolkiewski and Turnbull 2002). 
Again there is likely to be an asymmetry across each relationship facing a firm. 
 
The interactions between firms in a network also takes a specific effect at the firm 
level due to the difficulties of separating the costs and benefits of each relationship. 
Firms are rarely connected to a single other firm and so must manage a portfolio of 
business relationships. Portfolio management naturally brings to the fore questions of 
strategic priority and economic rewards and costs (Zolkiewski and Turnbull 2002). 
This leads managers to analyse the business relationships as separate entities, as there 
are trade offs between the “gains from working more closely with existing partners 
against the potential gains from developing new relations” (Wilkinson and Young 
2002). Further, a firm must foresee whether the adaptations made in a particular 
relationship will provide the expected outcomes (Ford 2002; Håkansson 1982; 
Turnbull and Valla 1986). However, this will be difficult for firms due to the inherent 
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nature of diversity in the business network. The complexity of interactions across 
many firms makes it difficult to estimate the direct costs and benefits gained from 
each relationship. However, these difficulties will not stop managers from attributing 
profits/expenses against each partner and so deciding strategic intent, along with a 
variation in the way each relationship in the portfolio is managed. These differences 
in strategic importance will lead to a natural asymmetry in the way firms manage their 
relationships. 
 
The organization of interaction within business relationships from a firm’s perspective 
takes an interesting turn, for all interaction is joint (Ford and Håkansson 2006). The 
idea of joint interaction refers to the ways at least two firms cooperate on basis of 
complementarity of resources and/or access to customers. The single firm must 
cooperate to achieve profit. There is no alternative for a single firm, but to cooperate 
to some degree (Håkansson and Snehota 1989). This interaction between firms is 
based on the complementarity in either resources or access to customers, and 
noteworthy is the asymmetry across the relationship. The differences are an important 
part of how value is created. Each firm brings a different perspective and network 
connections which are the driver of value creation within that relationship. 
 
The distinction between firms in business relationships suggests the examination of 
firms according to the complementary nature of relationships. The problems of 
managing a portfolio of firms within limited resources, including time, suggest that 
any study of the complementarity of firms in relationships must also account for 
strategic intent across the portfolio. However, the quantitative study of 
complementarity and interaction across a relationship is not easy, because of the 
issues in measuring dyad level constructs. 
 
Methodological Issues with Dyad Analysis of Inter-organizational Constructs 
 
The idea of two codes (Halinen 1998) has important implications for quantitative 
analysis of a business relationship. The joining of two firms within business 
relationships, which results from the opposing and cooperative nature of business 
relationships, means that each party has different perspectives. The recent comparison 
of dyad data by Anderson, et al. (2006) shows again that neither party to a 
relationship has the same perspective. There is a long history of such results 
(Gundlach and Cadotte 1994; Heide and John 1990; John and Reve 1982; Kim 2000). 
We should not expect exactly similar perspectives across a dyad; asymmetry is more 
natural.  
 
The idea of two codes in business relationships means analysis of dyads must first 
proceed from the single firm, and then move to the dyad level. For example, 
Anderson and Narus (1990) and Barnes, et al. (2005) undertake analysis of buyers and 
suppliers independently of the other firm in the dyad. These researchers require a 
dyadic theory to move to a relationship level analysis. Alternate approaches that 
consider generating dyad level constructs by aggregation of indicators from each side 
of the relationship provide an average of two perspectives, effectively averaging two 
different points of view generated by different network positions and different codes.  
 
This problem also exists when a weighting scheme is applied to arrive at a measure of 
the dyad level construct (Medlin 2003a), without first checking for equivalence and 
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closeness of perspective. This problem is apparent in the theoretical conclusions 
drawn by Anderson, et al. (2006) as they rely on constraining the measure-specific 
factor loadings for the responses of four respondents from two firms to be equal 
(pp.34-35). Comparison of measurement specificity of relationship level constructs in 
this study relies on a theoretically non-existent construct. One can further say that 
provided the firms are small in size and that the respondent chosen is the most 
appropriate for the study that the issues of using summed indicators in regression 
analysis is also not a concern. 
 
Evidently examining dyads quantitatively is difficult. Each firm comes to the business 
relationship with a different purpose and may have a different way of interacting to 
achieve the strategic intent. This means modelling a dyad quantitatively requires a 
dependent variable that encompasses the behaviour of both firms, yet leaves each firm 
free to pursue its own goals and way of acting (Medlin and Rao 2004). To undertake 
analysis of dyads requires two steps. First, the firms must be grouped according to 
their different codes. Second, the dyad part of the analysis, involves a comparison of 
firms in dyads according to the way each relationship is composed of different pairs 
of codes. This technique of analysis requires a dependent variable that is at a 





Inter-organizational relationships are found in various complex forms (Ford et al., 
2002). Each inter-organizational relationship exhibits a certain level of conflict, 
cooperation, collaborative and self interests simultaneously (Bengtsson and Kock 
1999; Medlin 2006; Young and Wilkinson 1997). Firms cooperate simultaneously to 
gain and expand economical benefits and resources, while they “compete over the 
means to do this and over the division of rewards and resources” (Wilkinson and 
Wiley 2000). 
 
The complementary nature of business relationships within a firm’s portfolio can be 
analysed according to the nature of interdependence. Organizations are interdependent 
for sales, supplies, information, technology, development and access to other 
companies in the surrounding network (Turnbull et al. 1996). Given the strategic 
purposes of relationship portfolios and the interdependency between firms we can see 
that relationship must be composed of the following six strategic imperatives (see 
table 1). This schema is derived from two dimensions. The first is a recognition of 
business relationships as a means to access either resources or customers (Håkansson 
and Snehota 1995). The second is the geographic nature of the market; whether local 
or distant, which will influence the ease of interaction between the firms.  
 
Table 1: Strategy focus 
1. Resource dependency on the other firms 
2. Stable suppliers with agreed terms and conditions 
3. Niche suppliers 
4. Entry to local market 
5. Entry to other market 
6. Other contingent factors in each dyadic relationship 
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Necessarily, each firm in a dyad has complementary strategies to the partner firm. 
Thus relationships are likely to be composed of pairs of firms pursuing 
complementary, but different, strategies. For example, one firm will provide a 
technical resource according to agreed terms (ie strategy 2), and the other firm will be 
dependent of continuing supply of that resource (ie strategy 1). In addition, we can see 
combinations of strategies even by the one firm in a relationship. For example, the 
supplying firm in the above example may also be pursuing a strategy of entering a 
local market (ie strategy 4), in addition to providing a technical resource. However, in 
all cases there will be a natural complementarity of strategies across the dyad so that 
joint action occurs. 
 
The firm and dyad framework applied in this study is based on an empirical model 
that explains relationship performance. The constructs explaining relationship 
performance allow grouping of the firm management processes according to whether 
the code is substantially self or cooperative interest (Medlin 2003b; Medlin et al. 
2005). The relationship performance construct captures each firm’s understanding of 
the joint performance of the two firms relative to expectations, allowing an analysis of 
different behaviours of firms in relationships (Medlin, 2003).  
 
Since interaction takes place between at least two firms, each firm may have its own 
perspective and expectations of outcomes from the interaction. Similarly, each firm 
involved in a relationship may have its set of goals and self and/or collective interests, 
different from the other firm (Medlin 2006). The joint action between two firms 
involves the use of each firm’s resources, with the aim of achieving economic goals 
or profits. These economic outcomes are explained to be a firm’s self-interest, 
resulting in long-term collaboration between the firms. Thus even though a joint 
venture may involve inter-related activities, each firm may have a self-interest in the 
collective outcomes. In contrast, a collective interest is explained to be central to the 
relationship, where each firm shares similar expectations and perspective of outcomes 
from a relationship (Medlin et al. 2005).  
 
The construct indicators in the empirical model are detailed in appendix A. The model 
in full is available in Medlin et al. (2005). The model as examined in this paper is as 
follows: 






A survey was conducted to study the portfolio of relationships of a software 
development company based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The study focuses 
on strategic business partners from within the UAE as well as multinational 
organisations that have an interest in the UAE, distributors, agents, suppliers and 
long-term clients (joint ventures only). Firms from each side of the relationships 
completed the survey. 
 
The focus firm’s Managing Partner identified the participating firms and the point of 
contact in those firms, such as senior level management and CEOs. Each respondent 
was contacted introducing the nature of the study and establishing acceptance to 
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respond. Next, the link to a web-survey was passed to the participating firm’s 
managers via email, and the focus firm’s senior level management filled the 
corresponding response. In total, 26 surveys were returned, representing 13 dyads. 
 
The strategy focus of each firm was identified by the manager of the focus firm, and 
this was checked by the alternate partner manager. Managers were asked to attribute 





The research is based on quantitative approach that operationalises the relationship 
performance construct (Aulakh et al. 1996; Holm et al. 1996; Medlin 2003b; Medlin 
2006). This involves three steps. First factor analysis to select indicators for 
measurement of constructs. Each of the constructs was uni-dimensional with Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin Measures of Sampling Adequacy ranging from 0.599 to 0.830. 
Aggregating indicator scores formed the measures for each construct (Li and 
Calantone 1998). Anderson et al. (2006) argue this approach leads to unknown 
degrees of informant bias. However, our sample consists of small firms and small 
departments whose informants were likely to fully understand the relationship and 
firm level constructs we examined. In these cases a sum-scale does not significantly 
increase measurement error, especially when care is taken with respondent selection. 
 
Next, step-wise regression analysis was conducted of the full sample to find the 
general model explaining firm perception of relationship performance. This step 
makes explicit the active constructs, which explain variation in relationship 
performance. The results indicated only ‘economic goals’ explained relationship 
performance (β=0.727, t=5.192, adjusted R2=0.509). The non-significance of other 
constructs is likely a result of the small sample size. To further our exploratory study 
each construct was regressed separately against the dependent variable. Only ‘time 
perspective’ was found to be significant (see table two). 
 
Table 2: Independent Regression results for Relationship Performance 
Construct Standardised β T value 
Economic goal 0.727 5.192 
Time perspective 0.579 3.478 
 
In a further exploratory step, the model of the focus firm was examined with a 
stepwise regression (n=13). The result is relationship performance is explained by 
economic goal (β=0.689, t=3.151) with adjusted R2= 0.427. Thus, the focus firm’s 
model has similar active constructs to the general model. 
 
The final step, where relationships are examined dyadically, was undertaken 
qualitatively because of the low number of respondents. This analysis involved 






The results are discussed in three sections. First, the portfolio of the focus firm is 
examined according to strategy and importance of each relationship. Second, the 
results of the regression analysis allow comment at the firm level on the main 
constructs explaining relationship performance. Third, the models across each dyad 
are considered qualitatively. This allows comment on the effects of symmetry or 
asymmetry on relationship performance. 
 
Portfolio Analysis 
Table three shows the strategic focus of each relationship in the focus firm’s portfolio. 
The strategic focus is shown as in table one, where access to resources and customers 
is attributed to market entry. The focus firm has developed relationships that secure 
resources on the one hand (ie 1, 3, 5, 9, 12) and provide access to markets on the other 
(ie 4, 7, 8, 13). Given the technological nature of the software industry in which the 
focus firm participates this pattern is to be expected. 
 








(as per table 1) 
Strategy importance 
FocusFirm UAE 1, 3 High 1 
Other USA 4  
FocusFirm UAE 2 Low 2 
Other UAE 4  
FocusFirm UAE 3, 1 Medium 3 
Other USA 4  
FocusFirm UAE 5 Low 4 
Other Italy 3,1  
FocusFirm UAE 3,1 High 5 
Other Canada 4  
FocusFirm UAE 2,3 Medium 6 
Other France 4  
FocusFirm UAE 5 High 7 
Other Kuwait 1  
FocusFirm UAE 5 Low 8 
Other India 3,1  
FocusFirm UAE 1,3,6 High 9 
Other UAE 3,1  
FocusFirm UAE 6 Low 10 
Other UAE 6  
FocusFirm UAE 2,1 Medium 11 
Other UAE 4,5  
FocusFirm UAE 1,3,6 High 12 
Other UAE 1,3  
FocusFirm UAE 2,3,1,5 High 13 




Firm Management Model 
 
When all firms are considered (ie both parties to each relationship), the general view 
is that ‘economic goals’ and ‘time perspective’ explain variation on ‘relationship 
performance’. A likely explanation for this observation could be that relationships 
between most firms analysed are very recent and or the firms themselves are too 
young. It would appear that the portfolio of relationships for the focus firm is still 





There is no method that allows quantitative assessment of such a small number of 
dyads, however qualitative results are examinable based on the degree of similarity 
between firm’s management models for Relationship Performance. Dyads can be 
composed as having symmetry or asymmetry on their measures for Relationship 
Performance, as well as each of the active constructs. Standardising the scores allows 
for comparison of differences by dyad parties according to a simple rule, where 
asymmetry was considered as any difference greater than 0.5. Positive values greater 
than 1.0 represent strong relative strength and values below –1.0 represent low 
relative strength. Values between –1.0 and 1.0 were considered medium values 
attribution on that construct. Each dyad was attributed to represent asymmetry or 
symmetry on each active construct. Where the two parties displayed symmetry of 
perspective the further step was taken to attribute the level of the construct as high, 
medium or low (see table 4).  
 
On the basis of table four, a dyadic analysis of the relationships within the focus 
firm’s portfolio shows no clear pattern. There appears to be an association between 
the level of strategic importance of a relationship and the ability of the focus firm to 
match the partner firm’s attribution of relationship performance, with three of six 
matches compared to low strategic importance with zero of four. Dyad 11 is the only 
relationship where there is a high level of agreement between the parties on all 
constructs. There is a similarity of cultural backgrounds and low attribution on each 
construct. Dyads 1 and 12 represent example of where both parties attribute high 
relationship performance and the focus firm considers these relationships to have high 





This study highlights again that asymmetry of perceptions across business 
relationships is the norm. Accepting the ‘two-code’ concept of business relationships 
highlights the need for two kinds of future research. First, a deeper theoretical 
understanding of the effects of combining two separate firm codes in a relationship is 
required. The constructs for this work are already present in the literature (cf Ford and 
Håkansson 2006), and these need to be developed within the concept of ‘two codes’. 
Second, the methods for analysis of quantitative dyad data require further elaboration. 
Collecting dyad data is not enough; the data collected needs to reflect the nature of 
joint and single firm outcomes, actions and interactions. Further, a dependent variable 
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is required that measures a relationship level construct, so that there is some basis for 
theoretical analysis of two firms.  
 














High FocusFirm UAE 0.73 Sym 1.00 Asym 1.28 Asym 1 
 Other USA 1.12 High 0.39  0.53  
Low FocusFirm UAE -0.82 Asym -1.46 Asym -0.21 Sym 2 
 Other UAE 0.21  -0.02  -0.46 Med 
Medium FocusFirm UAE -0.82 Asym 1.00 Sym 1.28 Sym 3 
 Other USA 0.60  1.00 High 1.28 High 
Low FocusFirm UAE -0.82 Asym -0.64 Asym -1.20 Asym 4 
 Other Italy 0.47  1.00  0.04  
High FocusFirm UAE 0.47 Sym 0.39 Sym  0.04 Asym 5 
 Other Canada 0.47 Med  0.59 Med 0.66  
Medium FocusFirm UAE -0.04 Sym  -0.64 Asym 0.04 Asym 6 
 Other France 0.47 Med 0.18  0.66  
High FocusFirm UAE -0.17 Asym  0.39 Asym  0.04 Sym  7 
 Other Kuwait 0.47  -0.23  0.04 Med 
Low FocusFirm UAE -0.82 Asym  -2.70 Asym -0.70 Asym 8 
 Other India -0.17  1.00  0.29  
High FocusFirm UAE 1.12 Asym 1.00 Asym 1.28 Asym 9 
 Other UAE -2.75  -2.29  -2.68  
Low FocusFirm UAE 0.73 Asym -0.85 Sym 0.41 Asym 10 
 Other UAE -1.85  -0.23 Low -1.20  
Medium FocusFirm UAE -0.82 Sym -0.23 Sym -1.20 Sym 11 
 Other UAE -1.33 Low -0.23 Low -1.08 Low 
High FocusFirm UAE 1.12 Sym 1.00 Asym 1.28 Asym 12 
 Other UAE 1.12 High -0.44  -1.20  
High FocusFirm UAE 0.21 Asym 0.59 Sym 0.04 Asym 13 
 Other Egypt 1.12  0.39 Med 0.78  
Key: Dyads are classified as Symmetric (i.e. Sym) where the difference on the score is 0.5 or less.  
          Symmetric dyads are classified as High, Medium, Low according to distributions in appendix A 
 
 
The high degree of asymmetry found in this study of a portfolio of 13 relationships 
points to the difficulties of explaining quantitatively the interaction between firms. 
Future research should examine, within a dyad framework, the range of variables that 
represent different relationship interaction modes and relate these to variables that 
measure joint and single firm action. There is a growing body of quantitative 
techniques for dyad analysis (Aurifeille and Medlin 2006; Aurifeille and Medlin 
2007), however care does need to be taken to maintain the two firm code within the 
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(Medlin et al 2005) 
5 For each goal indicate its relative importance to your firm’s overall strategy with regard to 
the focus relationship: Profit, sales, sales growth, * market share, * market share growth  
(extremely important - not important) 
1. We believe that over the long term our relationship with this partner will be profitable. 




3. This relationship is important to our firm's future. 
1. Our firm and the partner firm are very committed to each other. 
2. The partner firm is very committed to our firm. 
3. The partner firm is willing to invest time and money in developing this relationship. 
Commitment 
(Holm et al. 1996) 
3 
4. The partner firm appears more concerned with their own outcomes in this relationship. 
1. In this relationship the other party can be counted on to do what is right. 
2. The other party is truly sincere in their promises. 
Trust 
(Morgan and Hunt 
1994) 
3 
4. Our partner is perfectly credible. 
Relationship 
performance 
(Aulakh et al. 1997; 
Holm et al. 1996) 
5 Relative to your firm’s expectations in the focus market what has been the performance of 
the inter-firm relation on the following dimensions: profit, sales, sales growth,  market 
share, market share growth. (extremely strong -not strong) 
Source: Medlin et al (2005) 
 
